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Using Democracy Against Itself: Demagogic Rhetoric as an Attack on Democratic
Institutions
Ryan Skinnell
[T]he aspirants to tyranny are either the principalmen of the state, who in democracies are
demagogues and in oligarchies members of ruling houses, or those who hold great offices, and
have a long tenure of them. ~ Aristotle, The Politics
Politicians who emerge from democratic practices can then work to undo democratic institutions.
This was true in the rise of fascism in the 1920s and 1930s, as well as during the spread of
communism in the 1940s, and indeed in the new wave of authoritarian regime changes of the
21st century. Indeed, absent a truly decisive revolution, which is a rare event, a regime change
depends upon such people—regime changers—emerging in one system and transforming it into
another. ~ Timothy Snyder, “Donald Trump and the New Dawn of Tyranny”
In Book IV of The Politics, Aristotle extends his philosophical treatise on the art of
government to look specifically at various forms of constitutional government (democracy and
oligarchy and their many variations). In describing these various forms, Aristotle assumes what
we might recognize as a rhetorical orientation to governance, arguing that while there are
“absolute best” forms of government in the abstract, what counts as “best” must be adapted to
particular circumstances in practice. As such, he sets out to describe the varieties of oligarchy
and democracy and “ascertain the modes of ruin and preservation both of constitutions generally
and of each separately” (Politics IV, ii, 95). Among the varieties of democracy that interest him
is what he describes as a fifth form, “in which, not the law, but the multitude, have the supreme
power, and supersede the law by their decrees” (IV, iv, 100). Aristotle goes on to note that this
state of affairs, which “is clearly not even a democracy in the true sense of the word,” is brought
about by demagogues (IV, iv, 101).
There is much to argue over in Aristotle’s description of governance and its variations,
including his famous—and famously imprecise—definition of demagoguery. The definition of
demagoguery, starting with Aristotle, is an argumentative invitation I intend to take up in this
essay. Demagoguery is a subject of much discussion around the world right now in light of
international political affairs, but it is still somewhat murky as a concept, and it bears some
conceptual elucidation if we are to explain demagoguery’s presence in politics and culture and
address it.
As a number of scholars have noted, “Often, people use ‘demagogue’ to refer to a
speaker they dislike who happens to use unethical arguments” (Steudeman 7). The danger with
attaching demagoguery to a demagogue in this way is that we become ignorant to the seeds of
demagoguery that remain after one or another despot is removed from a position of power. In
addition, given the tendency to use “demagogue” as a synonym for “someone I disagree with,”
some rhetoricians, as well as other scholars, have dismissed its usefulness as a technical concept
(e.g., Darsey 470; Goldzwig 475; Hogan and Tell 479-480). But the persistence of the term for
more than 2000 years, plus its recent resurgence in popular discourse,1 suggests that
1
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demagoguery is still important. And as political theorist James W. Ceasar argued a number of
years ago, although technically vague, demagoguery “has at least a certain intuitive content” that
makes it worthy of continued investigation (319).
Given demagoguery’s inextricable association with speech, political deliberation, and
democracy, I accept Patricia Roberts-Miller’s claim from more than a decade ago that
demagoguery is fundamentally (though not exclusively) a rhetorical issue (“Democracy”).2 In
her newest book, Rhetoric and Demagoguery, she defines demagoguery as
a polarizing discourse that promises stability, certainty, and escape from the
responsibilities of rhetoric through framing public policy in terms of the degree to which
and means by which (not whether) the out-group should be punished/scapegoated for the
current problems of the in-group. (16)
Roberts-Miller’s definition informs my central argument in this essay, which is that demagogic
rhetoric necessarily incorporates arguments, topoi, and evidence that attack and attempt to
undermine the legitimacy of democratic institutions. But since demagoguery remains a contested
term, the definition invites continued rhetorical deliberation as we grapple with its usefulness,
persistence, and presence in world affairs, and consider what, if anything, we will do about it.
This essay proceeds in three parts. First, I begin by unpacking Aristotle’s definition of
demagoguery because, although it is imprecise, it also has much to commend it. In fact it is
possible, and even likely, that the imprecision of his definition opens space for rhetoricians to
continue to (re)discover some of demagoguery’s important rhetorical dimensions. Moreover, it
remains a touchstone in scholarship about demagoguery across disciplines. Revisiting Aristotle’s
imprecise definition can help us hone in on a better definition for our own needs. Specifically, I
contend that Aristotle’s definition illuminates an important characteristic of demagogic rhetoric,
which is that demagoguery fundamentally seeks to undermine the institutions of democratic
governance.
Next, I turn to what Aristotle’s definition of demagoguery can tell us about a prototypical
demagogue—in this case, Hitler. At a glance, rereading Hitler may seem to be “stacking the
deck”—that is choosing an obvious demagogue to make arguments about cultures of
demagoguery—but I contend that this particular example actually focuses rhetoricians’ attention
on demagogic rhetoric that is not reducible to a demagogic archetype, nor to “an emotional
argument that I disagree with.” Many scholars have attempted to distinguish demagoguery by
reference to the rhetoric demagogues use—its populist nature, its passionate (and unethical)
emotional appeals, its negative consequences, or the deplorable moral character of the rhetor.3
Any or all of these may be present in demagoguery, but they may also be absent; and they may
also be present in discourse that no one would characterize as demagogic. In other words, these
characterizations do not appear to be useful for distinguishing demagogues from nondemagogues. In looking to Hitler’s example here, I intend to show the culture of demagoguery in
operation at the time.
Ultimately, I argue that one consistent—perhaps defining—characteristic of
demagoguery is that it relies on appeals to a form of radical democracy in order to attack the
2

Given the rise of authoritarian leaders around the world who have employed demonization and
scapegoating to come to power, rhetorical scholarship on demagoguery has been making a
comeback after years of relatively little discussion. See, e.g., Gunn; Johnson; Mader; Mercieca,
Demagogue; Roberts-Miller, Rhetoric; Steudeman.
3
See, e.g., Gustainis; cf. Roberts-Miller, Demagoguery 21-31
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legitimacy of democratic institutions. In particular, I contend that demagoguery hyperextends or
supercharges direct democracy by amplifying “the will of the people” to undermine the
constraining functions of democratic institutions. Following efforts by rhetorical theorists like
Roberts-Miller to define demagoguery not as what demagogues do (with the emphasis on the
demagogue) but as how a culture engages in public discourse and decision-making (Rhetoric), I
argue that anti-institutional appeals can become a commonplace way of arguing about public
policy and are crucial for fostering a culture of demagoguery.
Aristotle’s Demagogue
In Aristotle’s taxonomy of governing systems, democracies are the best possible version
of constitutional governments because they are “safer and more permanent,” (IV, xi, 110) as well
as “more relaxed and gentler” (IV, iii, 96) than oligarchies (which are still vastly superior to
tyrannies). Nevertheless, democracies—and democracies alone—are susceptible to demagogues.
Given his reputation among rhetoricians as “the clarifier, the taxonomizer, the organizer, the
details man” (Neel 76), Aristotle might be expected to provide an explicit definition of
“demagogue” in The Politics, but none is offered. He does helpfully note in Book V that
demagogues “of old” had commonly been military generals, “[w]hereas in our day, when the art
of rhetoric has made such progress, the orators lead the people” (V, v, 132). In so doing, he
seems to clearly locate demagoguery in the realm of rhetoric but nonetheless eschews an explicit
definition of the term.
The closest Aristotle comes to furnishing a definition of demagogue/ry is in an analogy
worth quoting in its entirety:
[I]n democracies which are subject to the law the best citizens hold the first place, and
there are no demagogues; but where the laws are not supreme, there demagogues spring
up. For the people becomes a monarch, and is many in one; and the many have the power
in their hands, not as individuals, but collectively. Homer says that “it is not good to have
a rule of many,” but whether he means this corporate rule, or the rule of many
individuals, is uncertain. At all events this sort of democracy, which is now a monarch,
and no longer under the control of law, seeks to exercise monarchical sway, and grows
into a despot; the flatterer is held in honour [sic]; this sort of democracy being relatively
to other democracies what tyranny is to other forms of monarchy. The spirit of both is the
same, and they alike exercise a despotic rule over the better citizens. The decrees of the
demos correspond to the edicts of the tyrant; and the demagogue is to the one what the
flatterer is to the other. (IV, iv, 100)
It is important to note Aristotle’s sense of what makes a “better citizen,” which is for him
a relative term. In light of his earlier distinction between “absolute best government” in the
abstract and “best government” in practice, Aristotle does not assert that better citizens are
necessarily elites. Which is to say, in a best-government-in-practice any citizen may conceivably
be among the best, irrespective of wealth, pedigree, or talent if s/he advances and protects the
central objectives of constitutional government. The requisite corollary is that demagogues are
not necessarily members of the lower classes. In fact many, if not most ancient demagogues,
including prototypical “bad guy” demagogue, Cleon (Whedbee 71) were wealthy, privileged,
and/or aristocratic. In short, we cannot assume demagogues necessarily come from or represent a
particular class of people, nor can we assume elites are a natural bulwark against demagoguery
(see also, Roberts-Miller, Rhetoric 75-76).
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For another, although he later raises the question of whether or not it is legitimately
democratic, Aristotle maintains that this form of governance is a democracy, inasmuch as the
people have the power in their hands. Much to Aristotle’s chagrin, the people collectively act as
a monarch, but they are nevertheless participating in democratic rule by the free majority.
Third, it is noteworthy that Aristotle does not equate “demagogue” with “tyrant,” which
is the more common way of talking about demagogues. Toward the end of the passage I cited
above, Aristotle offers the following analogical equation:
decrees of the demos : edicts of the tyrant :: demagogue : flatterer
In this logical chain, Aristotle equates the demagogue to the flatterer—that is, one who panders
to the tyrannical leader. Note that the flatterer is, by implication, a subordinate of the tyrant—
subject to, but a champion of, the tyrant’s edicts.4 And like the flatterer, Aristotle’s demagogue
does not necessarily supplant the leader (though that is a potential outcome). Rather, as long as
the demagogue is a demagogue (as opposed to a tyrant), s/he remains subordinated to and in
service of the demos. This is true even if s/he has some control over how the demos’ will gets
focused, enacted, and/or expressed.
Aristotle’s demagogue/tyrant distinction also bears an interesting, if tacit, notion of
sequential order. Typically a tyrant attracts flatterers, which implies that the tyrant exists prior to
the flatterer. Likewise, the demos brings the demagogue into being. That is, rather than merely
being an unethical “politician skilled in oratory, flattery, and invective” (Luthin 3) or a “skillful”
speaker or writer who seeks to “influence public opinion by employing the traditional tools of
rhetoric with complete indifference to the truth” to his or her own selfish ends (Lomas 165),
Aristotle’s demagogue steps into a kairotic moment rather than bringing it about. In other words,
if demagoguery is the way a culture argues, then people arguing in that culture will use
demagoguery, and some of them will be successful. As I discuss below, this view is in keeping
with emerging theories of demagoguery.
Crucially for Aristotle, the fundamental perversion of this form of democracy is not
simply that the people rule as one, but that this form of rule relies on an inversion of the popular
will and the supremacy of the laws. In comparing this fifth form of democracy to the other four
forms, he notes that it is in all respects the same, save one. In the fifth form—the one that is
“brought about by demagogues”—“not the law, but the multitude, have the supreme power, and
supersede the law by their decrees” (IV, v, 100). One way to read this line is that demagogues
usurp the state’s power. Another way to read it, however, is that demagogues do not thwart
democracy so much as they supercharge it. Aristotle writes:
The demagogues make the decrees of the people override the laws, and refer all things to
the popular assembly. And therefore [demagogues] grow great, because the people have
all things in their hands, and they [demagogues] hold in their hands the votes of the
people, who are too ready to listen to them. Further, those who have any complaint to
bring against the magistrates say, “let the people be judges;” the people are too happy to
accept the invitation; and so the authority of every office is undermined. (IV, iv, 100-101,
emphasis added)

4

See Wohl for an extended and provocative discussion of the distinctions between “demagogue”
and “tyrant.”
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Elsewhere Aristotle refers to the threat of “extreme democracy” or “rampant democracy,” (IV,
xi, 110) and either term seems appropriate to what he is describing here. Demagogues, in this
reading, do not oppose democracy candidly, but rather lead rhetorical attacks against democratic
institutions’ legitimacy by amplifying and channeling the will of the people, even in
circumstances that are under the direct purview of democratic institutions.5
There are undoubtedly other ways to read Aristotle’s ruminations on demagoguery, but
that’s really my point. His imprecision is an invitation to invent in the available definitional
means. As I discuss below, democratic institutions are designed to limit, regulate, or mediate
groups’ and individuals’ will. And as Aristotle points out, the effect of demagoguery is that “the
authority of every office [in a democracy] is undermined.” Taken together, I contend that a
possible—and rhetorically advantageous—reading of Aristotle is that demagogues hyperextend
the principle of direct democracy to attack the institutions designed to regulate democracy.
Instituting Democracy
In enumerating the different possible kinds of constitutional governments, Aristotle
asserts that “a constitution is an organization of offices which all the citizens distribute among
themselves” (IV, iii, 95). I adopt the term “institutions”6 in place of Aristotle’s “organization of
offices,” but the basic insight remains. Democracy as a political system is based on the
establishment of relatively stable institutions. Democratic institutions have taken different forms
in different historical contexts, but in general, they including various administrative, judicial,
legislative, and executive bodies that facilitate the basic functions of governance (V, xiv, 114;
see also Signer 33). At their best, democratic institutions—which may include everything from
political parties to labor unions to the press, in addition to government offices and agencies—are
intended to distribute governmental responsibilities among citizens, regulate popular and
aristocratic passions, stabilize governing processes and procedures over time, formalize systems
for mediating difference and dissent, and thereby serve the common good. Often the functions
organized by democratic institutions get collectively referred to as “the rule of law,” which is in
contradistinction to the undemocratic “rule of man” (that is, rule by powerful individuals).
In addition to facilitating good governance, however, democratic institutions also limit
democracy, and in fact, they have to. By design, democratic institutions standardize political
5

Take, for example, the United States Senate’s refusal in March 2016 to consider Merrick
Garland’s nomination to the Supreme Court. Despite the Senate’s responsibility for conducting
the confirmation process, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell demurred, saying “The
American people are perfectly capable of having their say on this issue, so let’s give them a
voice. Let’s let the American people decide” (Kelly). Chair of the Senate Judiciary, Chuck
Grassley, agreed. “The American people shouldn’t be denied a voice,” he said. “Do we want a
court that interprets the law, or do we want a court that acts as an unelected super legislature?”
6

As I argue elsewhere, rhetoricians do not have a precise definition of “institution,” using it to
mean anything from “any man-made [sic] civilizing collective, including laws, cities, and the
arts” to “political communities, markets, and money” to “the systematic collection of specialized
professional knowledge” and more (Skinnell, “Toward”). In this essay, following G. Thomas
Goodnight, I use it to mean formal structures that “regulate [democratic] behavior through
providing norms that reward ‘acceptable’ conduct, sanction the ‘inappropriate,’ and order
expectations of exchange” (360).
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activity because the actual practice of democracy is never wholly in line with any one view of
political principles. In other words, democratic institutions formalize difference and dissent, even
as they stabilize and regularize governance (see March and Olsen; Schmidt). No one gets
everything they want. By necessity, democratic institutions have to exceed any specific group’s
or individual’s desires or advantages because institutions are fundamentally concerned with the
general welfare of the state and its stakeholders.
Democracy’s regulative function, in particular, is demagoguery’s primary target, and for
obvious reasons. Democratic institutions are supposed to staunch opportunities for ruthless,
corrupt, or unethical individuals from taking control—to protect the rule of law and guard
against the rule of man. Political scientist Jeffrey K. Tulis argues that America’s Founders, for
instance, put democratic institutions into place that would specifically mitigate against
demagoguery: “They attempted both to narrow the range of acceptable demagogic appeals
through the architectonic act of founding itself and to mitigate the effects of such appeals in the
day to day conduct of governance through the particular institutions they created” (97).
According to Tulis, the Founders accepted the continued presence of demagogic appeals, but
they hoped to build institutions that would blunt demagoguery’s edge.
To be effective, then, demagogues (or, as Aristotle evocatively calls them, “aspirants to
tyranny” [V, viii, 139]) must undermine democratic institutions’ ability to protect the rule of law.
And notwithstanding the careful development of anti-demagogic institutions, the people’s right
to vote means democracy is always susceptible to demagoguery. As such, I contend that
demagogic rhetoric encompasses, and even prioritizes, arguments that attack the legitimacy of
democratic institutions to regulate “the will of the people” (usually very loosely defined). That is,
a primary characteristic of demagogic rhetoric is that its practitioners attempt to turn democracy
against itself, and they do so by advocating for supercharging the will of the demos to attack the
limits of democratic institutions.
Hitler’s Demagogic Rhetoric
We can get a preliminary sense of demagogic rhetoric’s anti-institutional tendencies by
looking briefly at an example: Adolf Hitler’s 1933 “Policy Statement on the Enabling Act to the
Reichstag.” I realize the choice of Hitler will strike some readers as begging the demagogic
question, but in fact his “Policy Statement” is demagogic in ways we might not expect, which is
what makes it such a useful example. In particular, although it is a monumental and
catastrophically effective speech that marks the boundary between Hitler-as-aspirant-to-tyranny
and Hitler-as-tyrant, the anti-institutional arguments in Hitler’s “Policy Statement” speech were
rather commonplace in Germany at the time. As such, we can catch a glimpse of Germany’s
culture of demagoguery by looking at the anti-institutional rhetoric in an aspirational tyrant’s
speech.
The Enabling Act was a legislative measure passed in the German parliament, the
Reichstag, less than a month after a fire was started by a protestor at the Reichstag building (see
Kershaw 456-459; Ullrich 421-429). The Enabling Act effectively gave Hitler dictatorial powers
by granting the Chancellor7 the right to pass legislation without needing ratification from
Parliament. His “Policy Statement” in support of the Enabling Act was delivered on March 23,
7

German President Paul von Hindenburg named Hitler as the Chancellor in January of 1933, just
two months before the Reichstag fire. See Kershaw and Ullrich for excellent histories of Hitler’s
rise to power.
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1933, just hours before the decisive vote was taken. Hitler scholars have detailed at length the
fraudulent and coercive circumstances in which the Enabling Act vote was carried out, but the
speech is nevertheless noteworthy because Hitler still needed to convince members of the
Reichstag to vote in his favor. In other words, it was intended to persuade a (presumably)
undecided audience.
In the speech, Hitler proposes a “Law for Removing the Distress of Volk [the people] and
Reich,” which he contends would allow his government to stabilize the economy, to effect the
“national and moral regeneration” (279) of the German people, and to restore Germany’s
national sovereignty. He allows that his solution—essentially, establishing a dictatorship—is an
“extraordinary measure,” but it is nevertheless warranted under the circumstances.
Hitler’s “Policy Statement” illustrates two key issues for understanding how antiinstitutional demagogic rhetoric functions.8 First, the “Policy Statement” is not what we might
expect from one of the most consequential speeches by the most notorious demagogue of the 20th
century. There are certainly racist dog whistles throughout the speech, but as Roberts-Miller
points out, “Hitler did sound more reasonable than he had in his beerhall speeches. He never said
the word ‘Jew,’ and only mentioned race twice. He didn’t say anything about Aryans, and talked
a lot about the ‘volk’” (“Hitler’s March”). Nevertheless, the “Policy Statement” is demagogic if
we adopt Roberts-Miller’s definition of demagoguery as “a polarizing discourse that promises
stability, certainty, and escape from the responsibilities of rhetoric through framing public policy
in terms of the degree to which and means by which (not whether) the out-group should be
punished/scapegoated for the current problems of the in-group” (Rhetoric 16).
The “Policy Statement” is, in fact, a textbook example of demagoguery under this
definition. Hitler demonizes Marxists (which is basically anyone who opposes him); promises
stability, certainty, and escape from the responsibilities of rhetoric if he’s given dictatorial
powers; and pledges everything from “moral purging” to the ruthless eradication of “high treason
and betrayal of the Volk” (280). Although it is a demagogic speech, however, it is important to
note how not demagogic it might seem to a reasonable listener or reader, especially for an
audience without the benefit of hindsight to compare the speech against Hitler’s subsequent
actions. Hitler managed to restrain his virulent antisemitism, or at least constrain it to plausibly
deniable insinuations.
But second, and more importantly, a consistent theme of Hitler’s Reichstag speech is that
democratic institutions needed to be suspended and/or destroyed to save Germany.9 Given what
we might expect from an avowed anti-Semite, his anti-institutional rhetoric is almost subtle
enough to be ignored, but it really is the primary appeal of the speech. The central function of the
Enabling Act was to suspend the constitution, so that’s immediately apparent, but Hitler also
openly belittles democratic deliberation (“The completely opposite approaches of the individuals
to the concepts of state…will lead to a war of all against all” [276]); he condemns voting
practices (“It…results in a complete invalidation of the legislative bodies in the eyes of the Volk
when, even assuming normal times, the Volk is driven to the polls…almost twenty times in the
course of four years” [278]); and he attacks the rule of law (“The theoretical concept of equality
8

Rhetoricians would do well to spend some time with this speech, especially given its import in
world history. See Roberts-Miller, “Hitler’s March 1933 Speech to the Reichstag” for a good
example.
9
See Agamben for a discussion of the Third Reich as “a state of exception that lasted twelve
years” (9).
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before the law shall not be used, under the guise of equality, to tolerate those who despise the
laws as a matter of principle or, moreover, to surrender the freedom of the nation to them on the
basis of democratic doctrines” [278]). Hitler simultaneously lauds the importance of the
constitution, the judiciary, and legislative bodies (including the Reichstag), even as he asserts
democracy’s failure in Germany since the end of World War I.
In effect, Hitler lays out an extended—albeit somewhat oblique—argument that
Germany’s state of crisis was a direct result of the fact that democratic institutions failed. In
surveying the fourteen-year existence of the Weimar government, he claims that the steady
decline of Germany under parliamentary rule “served to promote the insight into the necessity of
thoroughly rejecting the ideas, organizations, and men in which one gradually and rightly began
to recognize the underlying causes of our decay” (276). In retrospect, we might understand this
statement as a claim for rejecting corrupt ideas (liberalism and Bolshevism), as well as corrupt
people (Jews, Romas, and Sintis, among others). But in the context of the speech, it could just as
easily have been understood as a rebuke of democracy, democratic institutions, and democratic
representatives.
Hitler’s initial solution—less obliquely—is to suspend democratic institutions in order to
restore the government and the nation to its rightful place as a servant of the people (“the Volk”).
Suspend the constitution, purge the judiciary, and subvert the legislature. Ultimately, according
to Hitler, the suspension of the Weimar constitution would result in further reforms of the Reich
government, which would then result in “a constitution which ties the will of the Volk to the
authority of a genuine leadership” (278). And he implies that if this temporary action is taken,
things will eventually return to normal.
In Aristotelian terms, this central element of Hitler’s speech—his central policy proposal,
in fact—might reasonably be described as “the demagogue mak[ing] the decrees of the people
override the laws…so the authority of every office is undermined.” Throughout the speech Hitler
asserts that the Enabling Act must be passed in the support of the people, and he even notes that
in voting the National Socialists into power, the German people gave their approval for the bill
that was designed to cripple the institutions that limited the will of the people (276). The effect,
of course, is that Hitler was granted dictatorial powers.
By my accounting, Hitler’s “Policy Statement” is an excellent example of the antiinstitutional quality of demagogic rhetoric. But it is important to note that Hitler’s “Policy
Statement” was also perfectly in keeping with more than a decade’s worth of speeches,
statements, policy proposals, and political campaigns by a number of Germany’s far-right
nationalist groups, including by definitely not limited to the National Socialists. Likewise, it was
consonant with speeches, statements, policy proposals, and political campaigns by Germany’s
business-friendly conservatives, a political faction that differed in significant ways from the farright nationalists. Conservatives were often concerned by Hitler’s rabble rousing, race baiting,
and advocacy of violence, but they were also often very comfortable with his anti-democratic
message.
In other words, as Hitler scholars have pointed out, much of what Hitler was arguing
throughout the 1920s and early 30s, up to and including the “Policy Statement,” was quotidian.
Hitler’s “Policy Statement” was successful in large part because Germany in the 1920s and
1930s was a culture of demagoguery. The argument that democratic institutions were failing and
needed to be scrapped was a relatively common one at the time, particularly among political
elites (Kershaw 424-425). For example, Hitler biographer Volker Ullrich cites German President
Hindenburg (a conservative) as being “quite pleased” with the March 1933 election that put the
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National Socialists in the majority because they could stop holding regular elections for a while.
“The ‘parliamentary hullaballoo,’ the president said, had always been ‘deeply alien and
unsavoury’ to him” (436). Democracy in general was distasteful to many Germans, especially
those that identified with the country’s right-leaning parties, because democracy supposedly
restricted the will of the people. Hitler came to power, obviously, but he was one demagogue
among many who might have risen to power in Germany’s potent culture of demagoguery.
A Culture of Demagoguery
Cultures of demagoguery flourish whenever the regulatory function of democracy is
weakened. Hitler’s “Policy Statement on the Enabling Act to the Reichstag” openly, and
unabashedly, championed Germans’ personal freedoms by attacking the limiting conditions of
democracy as corrupt, paralyzed, and overly constraining. He advocates weakening or discarding
democratic institutions in order to restore power to the people, but in so doing, he was repeating
and activating commonplaces—not inventing a new, demagogic reality on his own. The same is
true in a number of stereotypically demagogic speeches.
In Cleon’s legendarily demagogic speech in the Mytilenean debate, for instance, he
begins by proclaiming his conviction that “democracy is incapable of ruling others” (Thucydides
146). Cleon goes on to question at length the central value of democratic deliberation in the
Athenian Assembly, and although he champions the laws over “cleverness or contests in
intelligence,” his basic argument is for bypassing the democratic procedures established for
deliberative decision-making.10 Cleon was wildly successful, but he was not a lone demagogue
in an otherwise healthy democracy. He stepped into the role of spokesman for a widely
circulating series of beliefs, especially among military leaders. Likewise, in Huey Long’s
notorious “Every Man a King” speech, he explicitly attacks the New Deal programs and the
executive branch’s ability to serve the people (Long). The remedy he proposes is for his listeners
to join a “Share Our Wealth Society” to ensure the redistribution of wealth. That is, by
implication at least, he suggests “the people” need to throw off the constraints of the Federal
government and reclaim their own power. But again, Long adopted and adapted demagogic
rhetoric that had been in circulation in America well before he gave his famous speech in 1934.
I could go on analyzing traditionally demagogic speeches or figures to note their antidemocratic rhetoric, but there are likely to be diminishing returns. In fact, as James Darsey
argues, there may not be much value at all in proving that conventional demagogues are
conventional demagogues. In his critique of Roberts-Miller’s proposal for more and better
demagoguery scholarship in rhetoric, Darsey contends that referring to “the traditional roster of
demagogic figures”—including Adolf Hitler, Huey Long, Father Coughlin, and Joe McCarthy—
amounts to little more than stacking the deck (464).
Darsey’s criticism is fair if the central goal of demagogic rhetoric scholarship is to locate
individual demagogues who have led democracies astray. But as Roberts-Miller argues in
Demagoguery and Democracy, “We don’t have demagoguery in our culture because a
demagogue came to power; when demagoguery becomes the normal way of participating in
10

Whedbee notes, “Historical records provide no indication that Cleon ever engaged in any
action that would have violated the requirements of the democratic constitution” (79). By
contrast, Arlene Saxonhouse argues, “Cleon threatens democracy...by a professed reverence for
the past as a restraint. Decisions that were made in the past (even if it was only yesterday) must
hold, he claims” (154).
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public discourse, then it’s just a question of time until a demagogue arises” (2; see also Rhetoric
and Demagoguery 1-2). For Roberts-Miller, a culture of demagoguery replaces the hard work of
democratic deliberation with a simplified, identity-based form of decision-making.
Consequently, public policy decisions are made on the basis of in-group and out-group identity
instead of democratic deliberation. But identifying and recognizing demagogues that have come
to power can help us recognize when and where cultures of demagoguery are operating.
Roberts-Miller’s theory of “a culture of demagoguery” invites rhetoric scholars to back
away from some of the more troubling limitations of traditional demagoguery scholarship. For
instance, it urges us to back away from the easy equation of demagoguery with “arguments I
don’t like” or the assumption that all divisive rhetoric is equally harmful.11 If demagoguery is a
way of participating in public discourse and decision-making, rhetorical scholars can observe
that demagogic rhetoric may be widespread, non-partisan, ecumenical, and even relatively
harmless. In Roberts-Miller’s definition of demagoguery as “polarizing discourse that promises
stability, certainty, and escape from the responsibilities of rhetoric,” demagoguery is not a single
incident, such as a divisive speech or even a divisive figure, though those may give us important
clues. Nevertheless, demagoguery is a cultural campaign. And there can be multiple demagogues
at any given time, arguing for many different things, some righteous, some not, some publicminded, some selfish.
This cultural definitional of demagoguery also encourages us to back away from the
implication that success is a precondition of demagoguery. Hitler, for example, is the
quintessential demagogue at least in part because he was so successful as a politician and
totalitarian murderer. In other words, Hitler was successful, but there is every reason to believe
that if he hadn’t been, another demagogue would have arisen because the culture of
demagoguery was so strong and demagogic arguments were commonplace. We need not accept
that another demagogue would have enacted the Final Solution to believe that another
orator/politician/demagogue could have put the prevailing forms of public discourse and
decision-making to use in ways that profoundly shaped (or reshaped) Germany.
All this to say, that while divisive speeches or divisive figures who are successful may
give us useful clues to notice a culture of demagoguery, demagogic rhetoric can be identified
without the precondition that it has worked. Cultures of demagoguery operate even when they
haven’t resulted in tyranny. If we attend carefully to the anti-institutional appeals that I argue
characterize demagoguery, we can identify cultures where public discourse and decision-making
are predominantly demagogic before they become tyrannical.

What We Will Do About It
Cultures of demagoguery incorporate anti-institutional rhetoric as a necessary—and
significant—element. The attack on democratic institutions may be low-level (chats around the
dinner table or speeches in beer halls), it may be mid-level (in popular culture, journalism, or
voluntary associations [see Vitolo-Haddad in this issue]), or it may be high-level (official party
platforms or prominent political campaigns). It may even be the case that anti-institutional
11

Signer observes a “paradox” of demagoguery, which is that “demagogues occasionally have a
positive, progressive effect” (36). Nevertheless, even “beneficial demagogues” subvert the
system of law—it just so happens that in some cases, the law is corrupt.
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rhetoric is always present in a democracy because dissent is an important characteristic of
democracy.
But the key difference between dissent—which is formally institutionalized in democratic
institutions12—and demagoguery is that the former exists to make best-government-in-practice
more fair and responsive to “the common good.” Dissent, of course, may be uncomfortable,
painful, and even violent at times, but it fundamentally accepts the importance of democratic
institutions. Dissent is enshrined, for example, in judicial review, freedoms of speech and the
press, and freedoms to petition governments for redress, among others. Dissenting speech
defends the importance of democratic institutions even as it seeks to change them to better
support “the common good.” By contrast, demagoguery attacks democratic institutions’
legitimacy and seeks to end them, or at the very least, neutralize them.
Rhetorical attacks on democratic institutions may ultimately be good or bad, effective or
ineffective, ethical or unethical, but over time they can have the effect of destabilizing people’s
faith in the institutions that are meant to mediate democratic societies. Moreover, the use of and
eventual reliance on anti-institutional rhetoric—irrespective of the desirability of the outcome—
nurtures demagogic culture, which subsequently reinforces the rhetorical benefits of attacking
institutions. It is a mutually reinforcing cycle. This is why demagoguery—irrespective of
ultimate motives, good intentions, and so on—is so dangerous to a democracy: because it
weakens the regulative institutions that make diversity, difference, and meaningful reform
possible. In other words, demagogic rhetoric is always aimed at reshaping—if not undermining
entirely—democratic institutions.
As Roberts-Miller points out, “How we define demagoguery implies what we will do
about it” (Rhetoric 190). By defining demagoguery in this way, rhetoricians can begin to focus
less on the intent of demagogues or the ultimate outcomes of demagoguery, which are
notoriously hard to classify, and focus more on the rhetorical functions of demagogic appeals
against democratic institutions. We can see them in rhetorical attacks, for example, on free and
fair elections, due process, an independent press, and even the advisability of compromise in
legislatures. We can see demagoguery in our own circumstances and others, and perhaps most
importantly, with practice, we can begin to identify demagoguery in our own in-groups. Which is
to say, in a culture of demagoguery, demagogues are as likely as not to be people we agree
with—and they may even be us.
The value of such analysis, ultimately, is to recover demagoguery as a technical term that
has explanatory value before there is a demagogue of tyrannical intent, when we can still act and
bring attention to the culture of demagoguery. In so doing, we can begin to invent, and just as
importantly, practice arguments that take up the mantle of dissent—arguments that defend
democratic institutions as valuable even as we seek to reorient institutions to better serve the
common good.

12

I am well aware that formal institutionalization is not the same as practical actuality.
Nevertheless, dissent is explicitly formalized in democratic institutions, which means, at least the
mechanisms for change exist in a functioning democratic society.
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